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Mr. Cliff soon wrote a defense of the Cosmological Argument.  Here is my rebuttal:

Mr. Soon writes:

Right here one wonders, Are you going to present an falsifiable alternative? I mention this because evolutionists constantly claim that it is a requirement if one wants to disprove evolution. A ridiculous claim, of course (by such reasoning they would have to reject quantum physics), but any full-fledged evolutionist should get used to using such "arguments."

No, I did not produce a falsifiable alternative.  Why should I have to?  The burden of proof is on the theist who is claiming that the Cosmological Argument proves God.

I find Mr. Soon's dismissal of the need for a theory to be falsifiable quite illogical. He claims that quantum mechanics is unfalsifiable.  I admit that I am no expert on quantum mechanics, but if it isn't falsifiable, then it is of no use.  Well, unfalsifiable theories can be a brainstorming tool.  They can be useful in helping someone to think of theories that are falsifiable.  But that is all they are useful for.

Mr. Soon quotes me saying "it is really of little value in finding causes of universes." and responds, "here you simply dismiss this profoundly important issue."  Mr. Soon, in my opinion, quotes me unfairly.  What I dismissed was Moreland's comparing raising an arm to man as being like creating a universe to God.  This is "profound"?  Surely Mr. Soon jests.

Mr. Soon continues, "as I go back and read further, I think we will discover why: you have no plausible alternative, as I will argue."  Okay, so the fact that I have no plausible alternative elevates Moreland's comparison of raising an arm to man as being like creating a universe to God to "profound" status?  No, I'm afraid I must disagree.

Mr. Soon quotes me saying, "But once it is realized that something didn’t need a cause, it might as well be the universe ..." and responds,

This is an amazing leap of faith - that the universe, an astoundingly complex dance of fine-tuned physical laws containing a planet which statistically shouldn't exist (i.e. hospitable to life) in turn containing organisms, another statistical and indeed (naturalistically speaking) physical impossibility, all exhibiting signs of meticulous design, the whole requiring the creation of energy and matter on a ... uh ... "cosmic" scale - came from nothing, caused by nothing. Indeed it is an abandonment of logic to say this view is preferable to the theistic one.

But, Mr. Soon, your God likewise, "came from nothing, caused by nothing."  There is no mathematical way to calculate the probability of the universe having no cause.  But I concede that if there was such a method, it would generate an extremely small number.  But, what is the probability that there could be a God so powerful as to be able to create such a universe?

Theists seem to refer to the universe as having an "astonishment index".  (This term is my invention, but I think it an apt term.)  To the theist, the universe is just too "astonishing" to be exist for no reason.  (This is akin to the Anthropic Principle.)  And theists seem to contend that the universe existing uncaused must be inversely proportional to the "astonishment index".  Okay, let's assume this is true.  But then, wouldn't God Himself have an even higher "astonishment index" than the universe itself?  So, no matter how small of a probability of the universe existing uncaused due to its "astonishment index" one must conclude that the probability of God existing uncaused is of even lower probability.

Let me give one example. In Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith, Dr. Craig references Dr. Stephen Hawking who has calculated that if the rate of the universe's expansion one second after the Big Bang had been smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million million, the universe would have collapsed into a fireball. No doubt this ranks pretty dang high on the astonishment index. To be honest, I can see how Dr. Craig would conclude this points to an Intelligent Designer. And as an agnostic, I can't completely discount that he could be right. Yes, he could be right. Yet when one contemplates how much power and intelligence would be required of an Intelligent Designer to be able to design or control the universe to such precision, again, it seems like this Intelligent Designer must rank even higher on the astonishment index. So once again, no matter how high the universe ranks on the astonishment index, God must rank even higher. So if the probability of the universe existing ranks exceedingly low on the astonishment index, then the probability of God's existence would seem to rank even lower.

Mr. Soon quotes me saying, the universe's "beginning" to exist is a unique event in that there is no time for which the universe did not exist."  He responds, "this definition doesn't even make sense. Uniqueness is not based length of existence."  I believe Mr. Soon misunderstood why I deem the universe's form of beginning to exist "unique".  There is nothing else that began to exist in such a way as the universe.  That is what is unique.  But I concede that I may not have made that clear in my paper.  For this reason, I have added a paragraph to my Cosmological Argument paper.  I will include the new paragraph below so that one need not re-read my paper to find my new paragraph:

There is one more important issue about what it means to "beginning to exist."  When we say a house began to exist, we mean it was formed from pre-existing materials.  There is a law in physics, known as the conservation of mattergy (matter and energy) which means that matter and energy are never created nor destroyed, they only change in form.  Even living things, they "begin to exist" when pre-existing eggs and sperms join.  (Of course I'm only speaking of the physical portion, ignoring any possible "soul"--if there is such a thing.)  So, really, there is only one true event of "beginning to exist," the Big Bang.  Every other form of "beginning to exist" that we commonly speak of, we are merely speaking of something changing form.  Therefore, no other "begin to exist" has any tangible relationship to the universe's "beginning to exist."  So, once again, anything that we might say about "beginning to exist" in general does not for certain apply to the universe's "beginning to exist."

Mr Soon quotes me saying, "So the requirement of having a cause cannot be demonstrated."  He responds, "this is a non sequitur. Uniqueness does not imply this at all. Your birth was a unique event, wasn't it? Yet, like any other material event, we know it did require a cause."  But, my birth is not fundamentally different from any other "begin to exist"--except it is fundamentally different than the universe's begin to exist.  My "begin to exist" is fundamentally different in the following ways:

1.  There was a time before I existed.

2.  I was merely made from pre-existing materials.

Therefore, my birth is not at all like the "birth" of the universe and therefore they are not comparable.

Mr. Soon says, "the fact that God's being uncaused has 'not been adequately explained' does not change the fact that the universe needed a cause."  No, Mr. Soon.  The fact that if God can exist uncaused, then something can exist uncaused.  And if something can exist uncaused, then no evidence for why the universe can't but God can has been offered.  (Actually, yes, some evidence has been offered, but I believe I have shown that evidence uncompelling.)  Therefore, it is just as reasonable to conclude the universe existed uncaused as it is to conclude God existed uncaused.  After all, the universe must have a lower "astonishment index" than God.

Mr. Soon quotes me, "Saying God is a 'Necessary Being,' or 'He just necessarily didn't need a cause,' is no better answer than saying the universe just necessarily didn't need a cause.  Mr. Soon responds,

But it is a better answer. It has greater explanatory power and scope than the empty alternative you offered above. Why? Because, logically, we know that the universe required a cause. There is a confusion here that tries to equate the reasonableness of God's uncaused nature with the universe being uncaused. But this is a serious error. The universe is a material, temporal construct for which cause and effect point to the need for a cause. God, however, is by our logic and his own revelation, nonmaterial and timeless.

I disagree.  Your God is a "magic black box" that can do anything.  How does God create universes?  You don't know.  He just can and that's that.  But that is not explanatory at all!  Mr. says that "logically we know that the universe required a cause."  I would agree that it seems logical that it should need a cause, but seeming to be logical and actually being correct are not the same thing.  Like I said in my paper, who could guess that matter is made of neutrons, electrons and protons if we didn't learn it in school or do the research ourselves?  What we think we know logically isn't a valid methodology of discernment of causes of universes.

Mr. Soon quotes me, "Moreland says that things like universes can't come from nothing. But, apparently God can make things come from nothing. So how can God violate the rule that something can't come from nothing?"  He responds,

Moreland is right, isn't he? Universes don't come from nothing. And if God exists as I believe, he can make things come from nothing (except from himself and his power). The rule is misstated. It should read: Naturalistically, something can't come from nothing. There's no rule that says God can't create ex nihilo.

No, Moreland isn't right.  Or at least, he hasn't proved it.  We just don't know what universes come from, if anything. That's the whole point.  And the statement, "there's no rule that says God can't create ex nihilo."  Huh???  There's no "rule" He can either!  There's no "rules" at all, its just "belief."  Mr. Soon believes God can create ex nihilo.  How?  He doesn't know.  He can't know.  Its nothing but a mere assertion that He can.

Mr. Soon again quotes me, "so even though the universe had a beginning, whether it is appropriate to call the universe 'eternal' is debatable."  And he responds, "since the universe had a beginning, it is not eternal."  Okay, but by this definition, time itself is not eternal!  Which also seems counter-intuitive.  So my point is, things like eternity and time and all that do not necessarily follow our intuition and therefore it is not sufficient to claim that a universe uncaused is unintuitive in order to show that it is wrong.

Mr. Soon quotes me, "if there is a beyond-time realm, what it is like is also pure speculation. Such a realm has literally no time, no space, no matter and no energy. And none of our known physical laws apply."  And responds, "now, which is it? Is it pure speculation, or is it as you describe - no space, no matter, no energy, etc.?"  And my response is that at least to our understanding of time and matter and energy, they only exist within universes and therefore if there is a beyond-time realm, it presumably would not have them.  But I concede that we can't know for certain.  In my paper, I conceded that there could be some sort of "heavenly time" or "heavenly matter" that exist outside of the universe.  But, we have no way to know this.  It is just pure speculation.  Mr Soon says, "are you ready yet to discard quantum physics?"  In the beyond-time realm?  Absolutely.  I said this in my paper.

Mr. Soon says, "and our finite comprehension cannot be an excuse for ignoring the things we can comprehend, such as the universe's need for a powerful, intelligent cause."  No, our finite comprehension precludes us from knowing what (if anything) it takes to create a universe.